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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Guy Lewis Coulston, Jr., appeals from the summary dismissal of his post-conviction
petition. He argues that the district court erred by not holding a hearing on an alleged conflict
between Coulston and his retained post-conviction counsel and by summarily dismissing his claim
that the trial court’s decision to question some of the jurors in a separate room during voir dire
violated his constitutional rights.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Guy Lewis Coulston, Jr., sexually abused a minor child under sixteen. (Aug., p.15. 1) The
victim reported the abuse to her high school counselor. (Aug., p.15.) The counselor reported the
abuse to the police. (Aug., p.15.) The police interviewed Coulston, and Coulston made a number
of incriminating statements. (Aug., p.15.) The state charged Coulston with lewd conduct with a
child under sixteen. (Aug., p.15.) The case went to trial. (See Aug., p.19.)
During voir dire, the district court acknowledged the potential difficulty of sitting as a juror
on a lewd conduct case and offered the prospective jurors the opportunity to raise any issues they
might have outside the presence of the other prospective jurors and the public. (Aug., p.19.) Three
jurors said they wanted to speak in private about reasons why they may not be able to “render a
fair and impartial verdict.” (Aug., pp.19-20.)
The judge, the attorneys, and Coulston all retired to a jury room attached to the courtroom
for private interviews of the three prospective jurors. (Aug., pp.19-20.) Before any questioning
of the three jurors, the following colloquy took place:

1

The state filed, at the same time as this brief, a motion to augment the record with the district
court’s order dismissing Coulston’s petition for post-conviction relief.
1

THE COURT: . . . Does either side have any objection to having this type of hearing
take place outside the presence of the jurors and outside the presence of any
potential press?
[PROSECUTOR]: No, Judge.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And does your client understand that he has a right to have this type
of questioning take place in the court room in front of the press?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He does now.
THE COURT: And does he have any objection in terms of waiving his
constitutional right with regard to having that type of forum as opposed to having
questioning take place in private?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No.
(Aug., p.20 (quoting 4/2/2016 Tr., p.87, Ls.1-21).) Each of the three prospective jurors were then
interviewed in the jury room. (Aug., p.19; see 4/2/2016 Tr., p.88, L.8 – p.91, L.15.)
After the trial, the jury convicted Coulston of lewd conduct with a child under sixteen.
(Aug., p.15.) The district court imposed a sentence of thirty-five years with fifteen years fixed.
(R., p.9.) Coulston appealed from the judgment, and his sole argument on appeal was that the
district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. See State v. Coulston, No. 41396, 2015
WL 4275935, at *1-2 (Idaho Ct. App. July 15, 2015). The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s denial of Coulston’s motion to suppress. See id. at *2.
Coulston filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging numerous claims. (R., pp.912.) The district court initially appointed counsel to represent Coulston in the post-conviction
proceedings (R., pp.2-3), but Coulston substituted retained counsel for his appointed counsel
(Aug., pp.46-47). With the assistance of his retained counsel, Coulston filed an amended petition
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for post-conviction relief alleging numerous claims, including that privately questioning the
prospective jurors violated Coulston’s right to an open and public trial. (R, pp.26-33.)
The state moved for summary dismissal. (Aug., p.14.) At the hearing on the state’s motion
for summary dismissal, Coulston’s counsel informed the district court that he had received an
“Affidavit of Conflict” from Coulston asserting problems between Coulston and his retained
attorney. (9/21/2018 Tr., p.3, Ls.15-22.) The district court checked with the court clerk and
discovered “that there has been no affidavit filed with the Court by Mr. Coulston.” (9/21/2018
Tr., p.4, Ls.10-16.) The district court then proceeded with the hearing. (9/21/2018 Tr., p.4, Ls.1420.) At the end of the hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement. (9/21/2018 Tr.,
p.16, Ls.14-18.)
A few days later, Coulston filed his affidavit in the district court. (Aug., pp.1-13.) His
affidavit requested a “conflict hearing” and explained issues that Coulston had with his retained
attorney. (See Aug., pp.1-13.) Coulston listed eight motions that he wanted his retained counsel
to file and threatened to fire his retained counsel if the motions were not filed by the time of the
“summary of judgment [sic] hearing.” (Aug., pp.10-11.)
Approximately two weeks after the hearing, the district court issued an order dismissing
Coulston’s post-conviction petition. (Aug., pp.14-45; R., p.42.) As relevant to this appeal, the
district court found Coulston’s claim about questioning the jurors in private was subject to
dismissal because Coulston failed to raise the claim on direct appeal and because his constitutional
right to an open trial could not have been violated given that he failed to object to the private
questioning. (Aug., pp.21-30.) The district court’s order did not mention Coulston’s affidavit
alleging conflict with his retained counsel. (See Aug., pp.14-45.)
Coulston timely appealed. (R., pp.43-45.)
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ISSUES
Coulston states the issues on appeal as:
A) Did [the] District Court violate Coulston’s Constitutional Rights by not holding
a Hearing on the issue of Conflict once alerted by letter and affidavit filed by
Coulston[?]
B) Did [the] District Court err[] by not granting Coulston relief on the issue argued
by Counsel, being a Constitutional Violation of Coulston being present while
the Court questioned a potential juror[?]
(Appellant’s brief, p.2.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
I.

Has Coulston failed to show that the district court erred by not inquiring into the alleged
conflict between Coulston and his retained post-conviction counsel?

II.

Has Coulston failed to show that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his
claim that the trial court violated his right to an open trial?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Had No Duty To Inquire Into The Alleged Conflict Between Coulston And
His Retained Post-Conviction Counsel
A.

Introduction
The district court could not have erred by failing to inquire into Coulston’s alleged conflict

because the district court had no duty to inquire. The district court did not have a duty to inquire
for two reasons: First, the duty to inquire flows from the right to counsel and Coulston did not
have the right to counsel in his noncapital post-conviction proceeding. Second, the duty to inquire
can only apply when the court appoints counsel, and Coulston retained private counsel of his own
choice for his post-conviction proceeding.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court freely reviews whether the district court has a duty to inquire into an alleged

conflict between an individual and his attorney and, if so, whether the district court conducted an
adequate inquiry. See Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 615, 315 P.3d 798, 803 (2013).

C.

The District Court Was Not Required To Hold A Hearing On Coulston’s Alleged Conflict
The district court did not violate Coulston’s constitutional rights by not holding a hearing

on Coulston’s alleged conflict with his retained attorney. The district court had no duty to inquire
into the alleged conflict because (1) the district court had no constitutional or statutory duty to
inquire and (2) Coulston retained his own counsel of choice in the post-conviction proceedings.
First, Coulston has failed to point to any applicable law that imposes on a district court a
duty to inquire into an alleged conflict in a noncapital post-conviction proceeding. A district court
has a duty to inquire into an alleged conflict between a criminal defendant and his appointed
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attorney or a post-conviction petitioner and his appointed counsel in a capital case. See Hall v.
State, 155 Idaho 610, 615-17, 315 P.3d 798, 803-05 (2013). This duty to inquire flows from the
right to counsel. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 703, 215 P.3d 414, 423 (2009) (holding
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel imposes a duty to inquire on the district court in criminal
proceedings); Hall, 155 Idaho at 617-19, 315 P.3d at 805-07 (holding the statutory right to counsel
imposes a duty to inquire on the district court in capital post-conviction proceedings). The purpose
of the duty to inquire is to ensure that the defendant is receiving the conflict-free counsel to which
he is entitled by virtue of his right to counsel. See Hall, 155 Idaho at 615-19, 315 P.3d at 803-07.
Where the right to counsel is absent, however, so too is the district court’s duty to inquire. See
Green v. State, 160 Idaho 657, 658, 377 P.3d 1120, 1121 (Ct. App. 2016).
For example, in Green, a noncapital post-conviction case, Green alleged “the district court
erred when it failed to adequately address [a] potential conflict of interest.” Id. She claimed her
post-conviction counsel had a conflict of interest because he worked in the same public defender’s
office as the petitioner’s trial counsel. Id. The Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that the
“threshold issue” was “whether Green had a right to conflict-free post-conviction counsel.” Id.
The court observed that “[a] petitioner is not entitled to conflict-free or effective counsel when the
trial court has discretion to appoint counsel, as in noncapital post-conviction proceedings.” Id.
Accordingly, the court found no error because the district court had no duty to inquire given that
“Green had no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in her post-conviction proceedings.” Id. 2

2

Accord Hawkins v. State, No. 44725, 2018 WL 283779, at *7 (Idaho Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2018)
(“Because Hawkins had no right to counsel, he had no right to conflict-free counsel to assist with
his post-conviction petition.”); Vanzant v. State, No. 44629, 2017 WL 430228, at *2 (Idaho Ct.
App. Feb. 1, 2017) (rejecting argument that post-conviction petitioner “has a right to conflict-free
counsel”); Kellis v. State, No. 43463, 2016 WL 4072262, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. July 19, 2016)
(“Because Kellis had no right to counsel, he had no right to conflict-free counsel to assist with his
post-conviction petition.”).
6

Here, as in Green, the claim that the district court had a “duty to inquire” fails. (Appellant’s
brief, p.3.) Coulston finds himself in the same position as Green: a post-conviction petitioner in a
noncapital case. Like Green, Coulston had “no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in [his]
post-conviction proceedings.” Green, 160 Idaho at 658, 377 P.3d at 1121; see Murphy v. State,
156 Idaho 389, 394, 327 P.3d 365, 370 (2014) (holding, in a noncapital proceeding, that a petitioner
“has no statutory or constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel”).
Because Coulston had no right to counsel, the district court could have had no duty to inquire into
the alleged conflict between Coulston and his attorney.
Although the Idaho Court of Appeals has suggested that the duty to inquire may also flow
from procedural due process, see Rios-Lopez v. State, 144 Idaho 340, 342-44, 160 P.3d 1275,
1277-79 (Ct. App. 2007), the court’s rationale in that case depended upon the petitioner’s implied
statutory right to substitute counsel on a showing of “good cause,” see id. (citing I.C. § 19-856).
And the Idaho legislature repealed I.C. § 19-856 six years later in 2013. See 2013 Idaho Sess.
Laws Ch. 220. Moreover, the Rios-Lopez decision is irreconcilable with the Idaho Supreme
Court’s more recent Murphy decision, in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that a petitioner in
a noncapital post-conviction proceeding “has no statutory or constitutional right to effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.” 156 Idaho at 394, 327 P.3d at 370 (emphasis added). It
would be puzzling indeed to burden district courts in noncapital post-conviction proceedings with
a duty to inquire into whether a nonexistent right to counsel is being honored. 3

3

Coulston has also waived any due process argument by failing to assert the argument in his
opening brief and by failing to cite any authority for the proposition that procedural due process
imposes the duty to inquire on a district court in a noncapital post-conviction proceeding.
Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 323, 297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (2013) (holding
issue not raised in opening brief is waived); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp v. Butcher, 157 Idaho
577, 580-81, 338 P.3d 556, 559-60 (2014) (holding pro se litigants are bound by “Appellate Rules
and standards of appellate practice,” including rules on preservation, just “like all other litigants”).
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Coulston supports his “duty to inquire” argument with only a single case. (Appellant’s
brief, p.3 (citing United State v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1998)). But Moore merely exposes
the flaw in Coulston’s claim. In Moore, the Ninth Circuit addressed a criminal defendant’s claims
on direct appeal that his trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest and that he and his trial
counsel had an irreconcilable conflict. 159 F.3d at 1157-61. The Ninth Circuit explained that the
district court had a duty to inquire as to the conflict of interest because a criminal defendant “has
a right to conflict free representation under the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 1157 (emphasis added).
The Ninth Circuit also explained that the district court had a duty to inquire into the irreconcilable
conflict because, “if the relationship between lawyer and client completely collapses, the refusal
to substitute new counsel violates [the] Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”
Id. at 1158 (emphasis added). Coulston’s reliance on Moore shows that he has simply overlooked
the fact that he “had no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in [his] post-conviction
proceedings.” Green, 160 Idaho at 658, 377 P.3d at 1121. Because Coulston did not have the
right to counsel, the district court could not have violated that right by not holding a hearing on
Coulston’s alleged conflict with his retained post-conviction counsel.
Second, the district court had no duty to inquire because the duty to inquire does not apply
to the relationship between an individual and his retained private attorney. See State v. Daly, 161
Idaho 925, 930, 393 P.3d 585, 590 (2017) (“The court does not have a duty to inquire into a
defendant’s reasons for wishing to substitute retained counsel.”). The duty to inquire only applies
in the context of a court-appointed attorney “because [the defendant] must show ‘good cause’
before substitute counsel can be appointed.” Id. at 929, 393 P.3d at 589. For an individual who
retains his own private counsel, however, there is no need for the district court to inquire into any
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conflict because the individual is “free to substitute counsel at any time during the proceedings.”
Id. at 930, 393 P.3d at 590.
Here, the district court could not have had a duty to inquire because Coulston retained a
private attorney of his own choosing. The district court initially appointed a public defender to
assist Coulston with his petition.

(R., p.2.)

Shortly thereafter, a conflict public defender

substituted in as Coulston’s counsel. (R., p.3.) Coulston then decided to “secure[] . . . private
Counsel in this matter” and substituted retained counsel for his court-appointed attorney. (Aug.,
pp.46-47.) Coulston was represented by private counsel before he filed his amended petition (R.,
p.3), and all of his allegations of conflict relate solely to his retained counsel (Aug., pp.1-13).
Because Coulston had retained counsel, none of his allegations of conflict imposed on the district
court a duty to inquire. ----See Daly, 161 Idaho at 929-30, 393 P.3d at 589-90.
Even if the district court had a duty to inquire in this case—and it did not—the district court
did not err because there was nothing left for the district court to investigate by the time the district
court became aware of the alleged conflict. Coulston’s affidavit is a lengthy complaint about his
retained counsel that culminates in a list of eight motions he wanted his retained counsel to file “to
resolve these conflict issue[s].” (Aug., p.10.) And it gave his retained counsel an ultimatum: if
all eight motions were not filed “before summary of judgment [sic] hearing,” then Coulston was
going to “ask[] for an itemized Billing and a refund of any finances not used or retainer fee for
another attorney.” (Aug., p.11.) Put differently, Coulston’s retained counsel had until the hearing
to file the requested motions or Coulston would fire him. (See Aug., p.11.)
While Coulston’s retained counsel received the affidavit at some point before the hearing,
the district court first became aware of the alleged conflict after the hearing started. (9/21/18 Tr.,
p.3, L.15 – p.4, L.16.) So, by the time the district court had any reason to know of the alleged

9

conflict, Coulston’s deadline for his retained counsel to file the motions had passed and Coulston’s
counsel had not filed any of the requested motions. It is difficult to imagine what purpose
Coulston’s requested hearing would have served at that point in time, and Coulston’s opening brief
shines no light on the issue. 4 Coulston merely had to decide whether he would follow through on
his threat to fire his retained attorney—a question the district court could not answer. See Daly,
161 Idaho at 930, 393 P.3d at 590 (“Requiring inquiry or a separate hearing with sufficient
reasoning before a motion to substitute retained counsel was granted would infringe upon Daly’s
constitutional right to counsel of choice.” (emphasis in original)).
In sum, the district court had no duty to inquire into the alleged conflict between Coulston
and his retained post-conviction counsel because Coulston had no right to counsel in the noncapital
post-conviction proceeding and because Coulston retained private counsel and could choose to fire
him at any time. Thus, the district court did not err by not holding a hearing on the alleged conflict
between Coulston and his retained post-conviction counsel.
II.
The District Court Did Not Err By Summarily Dismissing Coulston’s Petition
A.

Introduction
The district court properly dismissed Coulston’s petition for post-conviction relief. On

appeal, Coulston argues the district court erred when it dismissed his claim that the trial court
violated his right to a public trial. But the district court’s decision must be affirmed because
Coulston failed to challenge the district court’s finding that Coulston could have but did not raise

4

To the extent Coulston is suggesting that he wanted the district court to evaluate his counsel’s
performance, the requested hearing would have been a waste of judicial resources because he
cannot raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a noncapital post-conviction proceeding.
See Murphy, 156 Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371 (“Where there is no right to counsel, there can be
no deprivation of effective assistance of counsel.”).
10

his public trial claim in his direct appeal. Even setting aside Coulston’s fatal procedural problem,
the district court properly dismissed his public trial claim because the record of the original
proceeding shows that both Coulston and his counsel told the trial court that Coulston had no
objection to questioning the prospective jurors in private. The trial court could not have violated
a right that Coulston waived.

B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings,
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts
and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,
903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).
C.

The District Court Properly Dismissed Coulston’s Public Trial Claim
The district court properly dismissed Coulston’s claim that questioning the prospective

jurors in private violated his right to an open trial. His claim fails for at least two reasons: (1)
Coulston failed to raise the issue in his direct appeal and (2) the record clearly disproves Coulston’s
claim because the transcript shows that he waived his right to a public trial with respect to the
private questioning of the jurors.
First, as the district court found, Coulston’s failure to raise this issue on direct appeal barred
him from raising it in his post-conviction petition. (Aug., pp.29-30.) Idaho law prohibits a postconviction petitioner from raising “[a]ny issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but
was not,” unless the issue could not have been presented earlier. I.C. § 19-4901(b); see Thumm
v. State, 165 Idaho 405, ___, 447 P.3d 853, 874 (2019). As the district court observed, Coulston
“has not shown, or even argued,” that he could not have raised this issue on direct appeal. (Aug.,
11

p.30.) Yet Coulston’s direct appeal challenged only the district court’s decision on his motion to
suppress. See Coulston, No. 41396, 2015 WL 4275935, at *1-2. Thus, the district court properly
found that I.C. § 19-4901(b) barred Coulston from raising this issue in his post-conviction
proceedings.
Moreover, the district court’s dismissal of Coulston’s claim on that basis “must be
affirmed.” Shackelford v. State, 160 Idaho 317, 323, 372 P.3d 372, 378 (2016). “[W]here a trial
court grants summary judgment on two independent grounds and the appellant challenges only
one of those grounds on appeal, the judgment must be affirmed.” Id. (brackets in original, internal
quotations omitted). Coulston “did not challenge [on appeal] the district court’s conclusion that
summary dismissal was appropriate because the claim was barred under Idaho Code section 194901(b).” Id. Thus, this Court must affirm the summary dismissal of Coulston’s claim. See id.
Second, even setting aside the procedural bar, the record clearly disproves Coulston’s
allegation that the district court violated his right to a public trial. “Allegations contained in the
application are insufficient for the granting of relief when they are clearly disproved by the record
of the original proceedings, or do not justify relief as a matter of law.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at
903, 174 P.3d at 873 (numbering removed).
The Sixth Amendment gives a criminal defendant “the right to a . . . public trial.” U.S.
Const. amend. VI. But the right to a public trial “applies only when all or part of the trial is closed
over a defense objection.” State v. Fairchild, 158 Idaho 577, 581, 349 P.3d 431, 435 (Ct. App.
2015). Moreover, the right to a public trial can be waived either by the defendant’s counsel or by
the defendant himself. See State v. Overline, 154 Idaho 214, 219, 296 P.3d 420, 425 (Ct. App.
2012) (holding defendant waived right to public trial because his counsel responded “[t]hat’s fine”
after the district court indicated it “would probably clear . . . the area”); Fairchild, 158 Idaho at
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581, 349 P.3d at 435 (holding defendant’s counsel “tacitly” waived the defendant’s right to a public
trial “by objecting to and arguing the merits of the state’s motion to amend outside the presence of
the jury”).
Based on the record of the original proceeding, this is an easier case than Overline or
Fairchild. In both Overline and Fairchild it was solely the defendant’s counsel’s actions that
waived the defendant’s right to a public trial. Here, on the other hand, the transcript shows that
both Coulston and his counsel separately indicated to the district court that Coulston had no
objection to questioning the jurors in private:
THE COURT: And does [Coulston] have any objection in terms of waiving his
constitutional right with regard to having that type of forum as opposed to having
questioning take place in private?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No.
(Aug., p.20 (quoting 4/2/2013 Tr., p.87, Ls.16-21).) Because the record in the original proceeding
shows that Coulston waived his right to a public trial for the private questioning of the prospective
jurors, the district court properly dismissed his post-conviction claim alleging the district court
violated that waived right.
Rather than address his waiver of the right to a public trial, Coulston relies on facts in his
opening brief that are clearly contradicted by the record of the original proceeding. Coulston
alleges in his opening brief, without citation, that the “[t]rial [c]ourt interviewed [a] potential juror
outside the record then asked for Coulston to waive the error, not having a clue of what took place.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) The transcript of the original proceeding, however, proved that the trial
court questioned the prospective jurors on the record with Coulston and his counsel present and
only after both Coulston and his counsel said Coulston had no objection to that process. (4/2/2013
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Tr., p.85, L.2 – p.91, L.15; see Aug., pp.19-20.) Because Coulston failed to raise this issue in his
direct appeal and the record of the original proceeding contradicts Coulston’s allegations, the
district court properly dismissed Coulston’s claim. 5
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s summary dismissal of
Coulston’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2020.

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of January, 2020, served a true and correct
paper copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing the copy in the United States
mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
GUY LEWIS COULSTON, JR.
IDOC #107837
EAGLE PASS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
P. O. BOX 849
EAGLE PASS, TX 78853

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
JN/dd
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The state notes that Coulston did not argue the merits of any of his other post-conviction claims
in his opening brief, including his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to object to the private questioning of the prospective jurors. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.15.) He has thus waived those claims on appeal. See Bettwieser, 154 Idaho at 323, 297 P.3d at
1140 (holding issue not raised in opening brief is waived); Butcher, 157 Idaho at 580-81, 338 P.3d
at 559-60 (holding pro se litigants are bound by “Appellate Rules and standards of appellate
practice,” including rules on preservation, just “like all other litigants”).
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